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THE HEALTHY WASHINGTON INITIATIVE:
BLUE-RIBBON PROCESS,
RED-HERRING RESULT
Vickie J. Williams*
"Quality, affordable health care is a right, not a privilege, and the
Healthy Washington Initiative will make changes that bring us an-
other step closer to serving all Washingtonians."'
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, empowered by the perceived public support for change
in the state,2 the Washington State Legislature established the Blue
Ribbon Commission on Health Care Costs and Access (the "Com-
mission").3 The Commission was charged with delivering a five-
year plan for substantially improving access to affordable health
care for all Washingtonians.4 After performing an extensive exam-
ination of the problems of access and affordability of health care in
Washington, the Commission issued its final report to the Washing-
ton State Legislature in January 2007.1 Unfortunately, rather than
taking the opportunity to move Washington boldly into the fore-
front of innovation in health-care access and affordability for all
citizens, the Commission recommended relatively conservative,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. I wish to
thank my research assistant, Lori Worthington, for her help preparing this Article. I
would also like to thank my very patient family members for their support and
encouragement.
1. David Ammons, Health Coverage 'a Right,' SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW,
Feb. 7, 2007, (quoting Christine Gregoire, Governor of Washington), available at
http://www.spokesmanreview.com/tools/story-pf.asp?ID=173082.
2. See Charles Barrilleaux & Paul Brace, Notes from the Laboratories of Democ-
racy: State Government Enactments of Market- and State-Based Health Insurance Re-
forms in the 1990s, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 656, 666 (Aug. 2007) (identifying
Washington as highly amenable to both state- and market-based health-insurance
reforms)
3. The Commission consisted of fifteen state officials and employees, including
Governor Christine Gregoire, the Senate Majority Leader, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Insurance Commissioner, and the administrative officials
charged with administering the state's public health insurance programs. See BLUE
RIBBON COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE COSTS & ACCESS, WASH. STATE, FINAL REPORT
(2007) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/consum-
ers/documents/Final %20Report.pdf.
4. Id. at 1.
5. See id.
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non-controversial, and generally ineffective policies. These policies
included enrolling state health-program beneficiaries in disease-
management programs, instituting pay-for-performance systems in
state health programs, organizing the private-insurance market to
be more accessible to consumers, and making the system Washing-
ton uses to insure its highest-risk citizens only slightly more afford-
able.6 The Commission's recommendations noticeably lacked
initiatives designed to change the behavior of individuals or private
insurers to increase access and coverage.
One month after the Commission issued its final report, legisla-
tion to implement many of the Commission's recommendations
was introduced in both houses of the state legislature.7 The legisla-
tive committees made only one significant revision to the initial
legislation, removing a potentially controversial provision. This
provision would allow exceptions to state coverage mandates for
health carriers offering health plans to individuals, small busi-
nesses, and young adults.8 The revised legislation sailed through
the legislature, and was signed into law with much fanfare by Gov-
ernor Christine Gregoire shortly thereafter.9 Unfortunately, rather
than representing a victory for advocates of meaningful health-care
reform for the uninsured and underinsured, the legislation author-
ized mostly palliative policies that will have little effect on many
currently uninsured and underinsured Washingtonians. It will have
even less effect on those whose risk of becoming uninsured grows
at the fastest rate, young adults. At best, the legislation imple-
mented will nibble away at the access and affordability problems
for poor and middle-income Washington citizens. It will not make
significant strides towards solving the problems of the state's unin-
sured and underinsured. Despite all of its promise and promotion,
the Healthy Washington Initiative squanders a rare opportunity of
public and political will coalescing in favor of effecting real change.
Part I of this Article explores the process that gave rise to the
Healthy Washington Initiative and analyzes the key provisions of
the initiative that are directed towards the problems of limited ac-
6. See id. at 5, 6, 9, 12. This Article will not further discuss the proposals regard-
ing improving the efficiency and quality of the already existing state health plans.
7. See Engrossed Second Substitute, S.B. 5930, 60th Leg., 2007 Sess. (Wash. 2007)
[hereinafter S.B. 5930].
8. See id.
9. See Ammons, supra note 1. Governor Gregoire did veto two sections of the
legislation, but they were of little consequence. One vetoed section was duplicative of
earlier legislation, and the other mandated an early effective date for part of the legis-
lation. See Certificate of Enrollment, S.B. 5930.
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cess to, and excessive costs of, health-care coverage in Washington.
It then suggests that the Healthy Washington Initiative will fail to
increase coverage for the key demographic of uninsured young
adults. Part II describes what an effective Healthy Washington Ini-
tiative should look like. It argues that the legislature could better
expend the current resources devoted to the Healthy Washington
Initiative. Finally, Part II suggests that the legislature change the
manner in which health-care coverage is delivered to reflect the
changing role of work and employment in our society, particularly
among young adults, who are at an increasingly great risk of being
uninsured.
I. THE HEALTHY WASHINGTON INITIATIVE
A. The Blue Ribbon Commission
1. Process
The Commission's process for soliciting input and gathering data
was thorough, thoughtful, and inclusive. The Commission formally
met eight times throughout 2006.10 Most of the meetings lasted full
days. 1 The agendas from the meetings indicate that the Commis-
sion considered a large amount of varied data to develop its five-
year plan to substantially improve access to affordable health
care.12 The Commission solicited input from a wide variety of
stakeholders, including health care consumers, health care provid-
ers, special interest groups, public and private health insurers, and
Washington businesses.1 3 The Request for Proposals specifically
asked for stakeholder input on six topics, ranging from aspirational
questions about the Commission's appropriate goals, to concrete
questions about the proposals.1 " The stakeholders submitted sev-
enty-three proposals, totaling over 700 pages. 15 The proposals
ranged from encouraging the continuation of the current em-
ployer-based system of health insurance through additional tax
10. See Washington State Blue Ribbon Commission on Health Care Costs and
Access, 2006 Meeting Agendas, http://www.leg.wa.gov/Joint/Committees/HCCA (last
visited Mar. 3, 2008).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See Washington State Blue Ribbon Commission on Health Care Costs and
Access, Request for Proposals, http://www.leg.wa.gov/documents/joint/HCCA/BRC%
20RFP_3_web.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
14. See id.
15. See Washington State Blue Ribbon Commission on Health Care Costs and
Access, Proposals Submitted by Stakeholders (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.leg.wa.gov/
documents/joint/HCCA/FinalproposalWeb.pdf.
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credits for employers and rolling back coverage mandates to facili-
tate the development of more affordable health insurance plans for
small employers and their employees, to establishing a universal
health coverage system for all Washingtonians, de-linked from em-
ployment. 16 Many of the proposals aimed to expand coverage for
specific consumer groups, such as children and senior citizens."7 A
few of the proposals were self-serving and specific, for example the
Institute for Healthcare Advancement's proposal to have the State
of Washington purchase a series of books it publishes called "What
to Do for Health," and distribute them through various health-care
providers in Washington.18 Other proposals adopted more commu-
nity-oriented and broad-based approaches, such as the proposal
from Group Health Cooperative, the largest non-profit, integrated
health-care system in Washington. Group Health suggested re-
forms that would mandate medical homes for low-income children,
improve the insurance marketplace for small employers and indi-
viduals, and focus on promoting effective care and healthy lifes-
tyles, among other things.19
The Commission had a large variety of data and proposals at its
disposal throughout the six-month period during which it met regu-
larly to formulate its final report and recommendations. The Com-
mission also examined other organizations' and states' health-care
vision statements, and surveyed health-care reform efforts
throughout the nation.20 It viewed presentations by a wide variety
of interested persons, including former Oregon Governor John
Kitzhaber, representatives of the Robert Wood Johnson Founda-
tion, the Washington Office of Insurance Commissioner, and vari-
ous other providers and employers. 2 The Commission also viewed
16. See Washington State Blue Ribbon Commission on Health Care Cost and Ac-
cess, Summary of Proposals (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.leg.wa.gov/documents/joint/
HCCA/ProposalsSummary.pdf.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 3.
20. See id. The Commission reviewed the health-care reform plans of Florida,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Vermont, and West Virginia. See Washington State
Blue Ribbon Commission on Health Care Costs and Access, Working Notes: What's
Going on Around the Nation (June 16, 2006), http://www.leg.wa.gov/documents/joint/
HCCAlWorkNotesonStatePrograms.pdf. The Maryland plan, known as "Fair Share,"
was struck down by the federal courts as violating the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder,
475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
21. See Washington State Blue Ribbon Commission on Health Care Costs and
Access, September 11, 2006 Meeting Agenda, http://www.leg.wa.gov/documents/joint/
HCCA/agenda9-1 1-06.pdf.
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a presentation on the history of health insurance and current
trends in coverage. 22 It received data from other government-
sponsored sources on the identity and characteristics of the unin-
sured in Washington. 23
2. Goals, Strategies, & Recommendations
In January 2007, the Commission issued its final report on health
care costs and access. 24 Noting that there are approximately
593,000 Washingtonians without health care coverage, including
73,000 children, the Commission set forth five goals that it had
adopted early in its deliberations in 2006: (1) all Washingtonians
will have access to health coverage that provides effective care by
2012, with all children having such coverage by 2010; (2) Washing-
ton will be one of the top ten healthiest states in the nation; (3)
population health indicators will be consistent across race, gender,
and income levels throughout the state; (4) increased use of evi-
dence-based care brings better health outcomes and satisfaction to
consumers; and (5) the rate of increase in total health-care spend-
ing will be no more than the growth in personal income.2 5
To implement these goals, the Commission identified four strate-
gies: (1) build a high-quality, high-performing health-care system;
(2) provide affordable health-insurance options for individuals and
small businesses; (3) ensure the health of the next generation; and
(4) promote prevention and health-lifestyles. 26
To further these strategies, the Commission made sixteen recom-
mendations, each of which directs the state to take certain ac-
tions.27 The recommendations can generally be divided into three
groups: (1) those directed towards state payors, such as Medicaid;
(2) those directed towards the private insurance market; (3) and
those directed towards providing tools and information to consum-
22. Greg Scandlen, Presentation to the Blue Ribbon Commission on Health Care
Costs and Access: The Origins of CD Health (Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.leg.wa.gov/
documents/joint/HCCA/ScandlenCHCC.pdf.
23. See Vicki Wilson, Dir., Presentation to the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Health Care Costs and Access: Washington State Planning Grant Access to Health
Insurance Project (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.leg.wa.gov/documents/joint/HCCAUn-
insured%2010-27%20Wilson%200FM.pdf; Press Release, Mike Kreidler, Wash. Ins.
Comm'r, New Report Reveals that the Cost of the Uninsured Rises to More than
$550 Million (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/news/dynamic/newsrelease
detail.asp?rcdNum=514.
24. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 4.
27. See id. at 5-16.
2008]
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ers.28 A number of the recommended actions required other state
administrative agencies, such as the Washington Office of the In-
surance Commissioner ("OIC"), to provide further reports to the
governor and legislature.29 A few recommended actions directed
state health purchasing agencies to act.3 ° Others specifically
charged the governor and the legislature to introduce and pass leg-
islation to improve the health of the population. 31 The Commis-
sion specifically noted that its work was only a "starting point," and
that the Commission was not expected to include all the ideas that
the governor or legislature might consider to address Washington's
health-care challenges.32
3. Pre-Legislation Reports
The Commission's final report tasked the OIC with providing
three reports to the governor and legislature to help implement
legislation designed to effectuate the Commission's recommenda-
tions.33 One report responded to the Commission's Recommenda-
tion #8: "Give individuals and families more choice in selecting
private insurance plans that work for them. ' 34 The Commission
directed the OIC to provide a report identifying the impacts and
likely tradeoffs in terms of cost and coverage if state laws were
modified to provide health carriers more freedom from extensive
benefit mandates in order to target insurance products to small
businesses, individuals, and young adults and/or children, by Feb-
ruary 1, 2007.35
28. See id. This Article will not discuss further the recommendations that are di-
rected towards providing additional tools and information to consumers.
29. See id. at 5, 8-9, 12.
30. See id. at 6, 7.
31. See id. at 10-11, 13, 17.
32. Id. at 17.
33. One of the mandated reports was to respond to Recommendation #6: "Re-
duce health care administrative costs." Id. at 8. The OIC was directed to provide
another report to the governor and the legislature identifying the key contributors to
health care administrative costs and evaluating opportunities to address them, by Sep-
tember 2007. This due date was extended to December 1, 2007. Telephone Interview
with Mary Clogston, Legislative Liaison to the Ins. Comm'r, in Spokane, Wash. (Nov.
6, 2007). The report was issued on November 26, 2007.
34. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
35. See id. Nationwide, the number of uninsured young adults (19-26) stands at
33.2%. See Sara Rosenbaum, SCHIP Reconsidered, HEALTH AFF., Aug. 14, 2007, at
w608, w614, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.26.5.w608vl. In Wash-
ington, adults ages 19-25 constituted 29.8% of the uninsured in 2006, and adults ages
26-34 constituted 21% of the uninsured. See Wilson, supra note 23, at 11.
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The OIC contracted with Milliman, Inc., a private consulting and
actuarial firm in Seattle, Washington, to assist in the preparation of
the required report.36 The OIC requested that insurance carriers
provide Milliman with at least one example of an insurance prod-
uct design that meets the Commission's criteria, the estimated pre-
miums for such a plan under the current Washington ratings
statutes,37 and the estimated premiums for such plan designs under
carrier-proposed changes to current rating requirements. 38 In ad-
dition, the OIC requested that the carriers provide Milliman with
their views of the plan designs and proposed rating changes' im-
pacts and likely tradeoffs.3 9 In order to encourage carrier partici-
pation, specificity, and candor, Milliman gave the carrier-provided
responses to the OIC without attributing the responses to specific
carriers.4" The OIC also hosted meetings with carriers and other
interested groups, such as consumers, small business organizations,
state health-purchasing agencies, and providers, to solicit their
views on mandates and rating requirements.41
Seven health plans provided Milliman with written comments,
and several provided proposed benefit packages with comparative
pricing for products with and without changes to the state's rating
laws. 42 Despite this promising process, the tight timeline for com-
pleting the report prevented the OIC from providing the governor
36. See OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM'R, WASH. STATE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR
AND THE LEGISLATURE IN RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATION #8 OF THE BLUE RIB-
BON COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 2 (2007), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/consumers/
documents/BRCmemo.pdf [hereinafter OIC RECOMMENDATION #8 REPORT].
37. Washington currently employs an adjusted community ratings approach. See
id. at Attachment 5 ("Comments Regarding NAIC Model Rating Requirements and
Washington State Rating Requirements"). Washington allows only very limited dif-
ferentiation in the rates offered to small groups. Currently, permissible rating adjust-
ment factors are: the design of the plan; the geographic area covered by the plan; the
family size; beneficiary age; and participation in wellness activities. Id. Age brackets
may be no smaller than five years beginning at age twenty and ending at age sixty-
five. Id. In addition, the rates for the most expensive coverage offered cannot exceed
375% of the rates offered for the lowest-priced coverage offered. The medical experi-
ence of all small groups must be pooled and annual rate adjustments may vary by plus
or minus 4% from the overall adjustment of the carrier's entire small group pool. Id.
The Commissioner must approve the overall adjustment, and there must be actuarial
justification for the adjustment. Id.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See MILLIMAN, INC., REPORT TO OFFICE OF THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON MARKETPLACE REACTION TO POTENTIAL CHANGES
IN BENEFIT MANDATE AND RATE REGULATIONS (2007), http://www.insurance.wa.
gov/consumers/documents/BRCreport.pdf.
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and the legislature with any truly meaningful information.43 They
were unable to provide detailed comments on the public-policy is-
sues engendered by eliminating specific benefit mandates. Nor did
the OIC undertake a review of the proposed changes' public-policy
implications. 44
The data that the OIC was able to gather showed a consensus
among the carriers that relaxing the current 375% maximum per-
mitted variation between high and low rates would lower the pre-
mium rates for young adults in the individual and small-group
markets.45 Unfortunately, for all of the specific sample insurance
products proposed, the lower premiums for young adults came at
the expense of higher premiums for older adults.46 One carrier
provided estimated small-group benefit plan premiums for two
products, one with a high-deductible and one with a low-deducti-
ble, with the proposed rate-band range change from 375% to
425%. For both products, the lowest premiums charged (presuma-
bly for covering healthy young adults) decreased 4%, while the
highest charged (presumably for the oldest covered adults) in-
creased by more than double that amount, 8.8%. 4
The carriers also submitted plan designs with limited benefits,
excluding many of the benefits Washington law currently man-
dates a.4  Limited benefit plans proposed included one designed for
individuals of all ages with a relaxed age slope, one designed for
children, and one designed specifically for young adults.49 Pre-
mium prices for these plans ranged from 84% of current premium
for young adults under twenty-four, to 95% of current premium for
those sixty and over.50 Not surprisingly, the plan designs that car-
ried the most significant savings over current benefit plans availa-
ble in Washington were those with very low annual maximum
coverage amounts ($50,000 and $20,000), high deductibles ($1500),
and limited benefits. 51 Several carriers that do not currently par-
43. See OIC RECOMMENDATION #8 REPORT, supra note 36, at 3.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 2-3. Three carriers submitted sample product pricing with relaxed
maximum variations in premium rates. Two of the samples were for individual prod-
ucts, and one was for two small group products, one with a $200 deductible, and one
with a $1000 deductible. Id.
47. Id. at 3.
48. See id. at 4-6.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 5-7. Generally, the more comprehensive plans excluded coverage for
maternity, mental health, chemical dependency, vision, skilled nursing facility, home
[Vol. XXXV
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ticipate in the Washington insurance market expressed a desire to
market limited-benefit plans in Washington, structured with a
schedule of benefits.52 These plans are typically marketed towards
part-time, seasonal, or hourly employees that do not qualify for an
employer's traditional comprehensive medical plan.53
Other concepts carriers put forward included a plan that would
reward healthy lifestyle behaviors by charging lower individual
premiums to those who maintain appropriate body weight, refrain
from high-risk behaviors (such as smoking), and appropriately
manage certain chronic diseases, such as asthma and diabetes.54
Still others were designed to be attractive to young adults by coup-
ling services that were most likely to be used by young adults, such
as maternity and pharmacy benefits, with high-deductible cata-
strophic plans.
The Commission's Recommendation #11 addressed the af-
fordability of coverage for high-cost individuals.56 The Washington
Legislature charged the OIC with providing a report to the gover-
nor and legislature evaluating options for restructuring and im-
proving the Washington State Health Insurance Pool ("WSHIP")
by March 1, 2007. 57 Specifically, the OIC was directed to consider
improvements and changes in chronic-care management, reim-
bursement rates and plan designs, and eligibility and subsidy
criteria.58
The WSHIP is a statutorily mandated public-private partnership
that provides health insurance coverage for anyone with severe and
chronic illness who has been denied health insurance in the individ-
ual market.59 WSHIP has been in operation since 1988.60 It offers
health, hospice, health education, community wellness, nicotine dependency, and al-
ternative medicine. The most restrictive plans focused solely on care in facilities,
eliminating coverage of most professional services. Id. at 5-6.
52. See id. at 7.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 9.
55. See id.
56. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. "Five percent of the people in our
health care system account for fifty percent of the costs of the system." OFFICE OF
THE INS. COMM'R, WASH. STATE, ADDRESSING THE AFFORDABILITY OF COVERAGE
FOR HIGH-COST INDIVIDUALS 1 (2007), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/publications/
health/210_ReportWSHIP.pdf [hereinafter ADDRESSING AFFORDABILITY].
57. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
58. Id.
59. See ADDRESSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 56, at 1. Insurers offering indi-
vidual coverage in Washington use the Standard Health Questionnaire ("SHQ") to
determine whether to insure an applicant. Any individual who scores over a prespeci-
fied amount is automatically denied coverage and referred to WSHIP.
2008]
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three health plans: a standard indemnity plan, which currently has
600 enrollees, a preferred-provider plan with 1700 enrollees, and
three Medicare "wrap-around" plans with 900 Medicare-eligible
enrollees.61 In 2005, more than 6000 applicants for individual
health plans were referred to WSHIP, but only 972 (one in six)
enrolled.62 Nearly 800 people disenrolled from WSHIP during that
same time period.63 This low enrollment in WSHIP indicates that
reforms are needed if WSHIP is to have any effect on managing
health care costs for high-cost individuals.64
In addition to the specific mandates from the Commission to
consider improvements in chronic-care management, changing re-
imbursement rates and plan designs, and changing eligibility and
subsidy criteria, the OIC also considered broadening the sources of
funding for WSHIP.65 WSHIP is currently funded by enrollee pre-
miums and carrier assessments.66  To immediately broaden
WSHIP's funding base, the OIC recommended that the legislature
appropriate $5 million for the current biennium, and convene a
task force to recommend equitable, stable, long-term funding op-
tions for WSHIP.67 The OIC noted that the state's Uniform Medi-
cal Plan's WSHIP assessments against stop-loss carriers are based
on only one-in-ten of its covered lives, while direct carriers in the
private health insurance market are assessed based on their direct
percentage of covered lives in the market.68 Self-funded plans do
not pay any assessment at all,69 which tends to increase the cost of
private health-insurance plans relative to self-funded health plans,
and acts as an incentive for an increasing number of employers to
self-fund their health benefits and remove themselves from the
pool of WSHIP funders.70 The thirty-three other high-risk pools in
use in other states use more varied financing mechanisms to subsi-
dize the inevitable losses between premiums and claim expenses.71
60. See DEBORAH CHOLLET, OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM'R, WASH. STATE, THE
AFFORDABILITY OF COVERAGE FOR HIGH-COST INDIVIDUALS: OP'TIONS FOR WASH-
INGTON STATE 1 (2007), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/publications/health/2118-Re-
port Reinsurance5.pdf.
61. ADDRESSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 55, at 1.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 4.
66. Id.
67. The task force would require additional funding. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 4-5.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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WSHIP also has extraordinarily high average claim expenses com-
pared to other high-risk pools around the nation.72 This results in a
spiral of escalating costs related to WSHIP for private health insur-
ers, which is inevitably passed on to their subscribers and em-
ployer-sponsors of these plans.7 3 The OIC-recommended task
force would have the formidable role of formulating recommenda-
tions regarding long-term funding sources for WSHIP.74
WSHIP provides chronic-care management services for a num-
ber of diseases.75 The OIC recommended that the legislature make
participation in care-management services mandatory to providers,
and provide monetary incentives to those who effectively perform
care-management services.76 It also recommended that WSHIP
explore the effectiveness of paying for medical services provided
by e-mail, group visits, or other cost-effective methods of deliver-
ing quality health-care services.77
Although disease-management programs may be worthwhile for
reasons unrelated to cost savings, such as improved patient satis-
faction and enhanced patient-provider interaction, the OIC's rec-
ommendations regarding the disease-management programs
ignore the growing body of evidence that such programs do not
generally reduce overall health spending.78 In fact, there is some
evidence that these programs, when applied to a very sick patient
population, cost the insurer more money than comparable care de-
72. The average annual cost per enrollee in WSHIP is $1418 per month. The aver-
age annual cost per enrollee in other pools around the country is about $631. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Chronic-care management services are available for depression, HIV, asthma,
diabetes, coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure, breast cancer, and stem
cell/bone marrow transplants. Id.
76. Id. at 8.
77. Id. at 9.
78. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE ON Dis-
EASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (2004), http://www.cbo.gov/fpdocs/59xx/doc5909/1O-
13-DiseaseMngmnt.pdf, Laura B. Benko, Disease Management Strikes Out; PacifiCare
Ends Program Early, CMS Cites Rising Costs, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 23, 2006,
at 9; Matthew DoBias, Big Deposit, No Return?, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 15,
2007, at 8; Melanie Evans, Minn.'s Hatch Blats Blues Deal; Says Expensive Disease-
management Deal Not Working, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 1, 2006, at 12; Joanne
Wojcik, Are Disease Management's Claims Unfounded? Vendors' Assertions that Pro-
grams Reduce Health Spending Scrutinized, Bus. INS., Apr. 17, 2006, at 13. But see
Independence Blue Cross' Disease Management Program Reduces Medical Cost
Trends By 1.5-2%, MANAGED CARE WKLY. DIG., May 26, 2006, at 36; McKesson
Reports Disease Management Program Saved New Hampshire $1.3 Million in a Year,
MED. DEVICES & SURGICAL TECH. WK., Oct. 22, 2006, at 117; Robert L. Whiddon,
Battle Weary: Disease Management Continues to Hold Promise for Advisers Wrestling
with Escalating Medical Costs, EMP. BENEFIT ADVISOR, Aug. 1, 2007.
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livered to a population not enrolled in a disease-management pro-
gram.7 9 Therefore, recommending mandatory participation in such
programs for a very sick population, such as the WSHIP popula-
tion, and recommending that disease-management programs for
this population be expanded, seems at odds with the Commission's
and the OIC's mandate to create more affordable health insurance
for high-cost individuals.
The OIC also focused attention on WSHIP's reimbursement
rates and plan design, in accordance with the Commission's direc-
tive. The OIC recommended statutory changes to WSHIP to pro-
vide more "benefit design flexibility."80 Usually, "benefit design
flexibility" allows insurers to have some freedom from rigid benefit
mandates, so they can offer less inclusive, and presumably cheaper,
insurance products. In line with the mainstream understanding of
"benefit design flexibility," the OIC recommends permitting
WSHIP to offer non-comprehensive benefit plans to subscribers in
order to bring down the costs of premiums.81 Nevertheless, the
OIC's recommendation for WSHIP also proposes turning what are
currently statutorily mandated maximum benefit amounts into
minimum levels of benefits that WSHIP must offer its subscribers
under the rubric of "benefit design flexibility. '8 2 There is no analy-
sis of the likely effects on premiums of these seemingly competing
mandates included in the OIC report. It is entirely possible that
the requirement that current maximum benefit amounts become
minimum benefit amounts will result in premium increases used by
insurers to fund the higher amounts of benefits that they must now
offer. These premium increases may completely offset any pre-
mium decreases that would otherwise flow from a pared-down ver-
sion of WSHIP's health plans.
Prior to the Commission's work and the OIC's recommenda-
tions, WSHIP guaranteed renewal of existing policies until the sub-
scriber becomes eligible for Medicare. 83 This inhibited WSHIP's
79. See DoBias, supra note 78.
80. ADDRESSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 56, at 9.
81. The cost of the premiums is cited by two-thirds of high-risk citizens referred to
WSHIP as a barrier to enrollment. Id. at 12-13. Nevertheless, even if WSHIP offers
policies that are not comprehensive, WSHIP would be required to continue to offer
comprehensive policies as an option for its enrollees. Id. at 11.
82. The OIC's recommendation would require current maximum time limits on
inpatient hospital care per year, inpatient mental health and chemical addiction ser-
vices, and skilled nursing services to be set as minimums, and increase the lifetime
maximum benefit level from $1 million to a limit comparable to the majority of Wash-
ington individual health plans, which is currently $2 million. Id. at 9-10.
83. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.41.160 (2006).
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ability to change any terms of insurance offered to any existing
WSHIP subscriber, even when the policy was up for renewal.84
WSHIP's only option to change or phase out a plan that was not
cost-effective, or that suffered from other flaws, was to close it to
new enrollees. 5 The OIC WSHIP Revisions Work Group recom-
mended that WSHIP's guaranteed-issue requirements be replaced
with a requirement that enrollees be guaranteed that they could
continue their general scope of coverage, but not necessarily every
specific provision of their current policy.8 6 The intent of this rec-
ommendation is to provide WSHIP with more flexibility to design
and offer new plans to respond to changing needs and
circumstances.87
Currently, when an applicant for individual insurance in the pri-
vate health insurance market is identified as one of the eight per-
cent of persons who would be most costly to treat under individual
coverage, the applicant is referred to WSHIP.88 This threshold was
established in 2000 to bring health insurance carriers back into the
individual market in Washington. 89 Nevertheless, four out of every
seven persons referred to WSHIP remain uninsured because they
cannot afford WSHIP or private health insurance premiums. One
possible strategy to make WSHIP premiums more affordable is to
lower the WSHIP eligibility threshold so that less sick individuals
will be placed in WSHIP, which will presumably lower the per-en-
rollee expenditures incurred by WSHIP.9°
In order to keep health insurance premiums and health insur-
ance carriers' retained-income levels reasonable, Washington law
requires a health insurance carrier to pay into WSHIP when its loss
ratio in the individual market is less than seventy-two percent.91
84. See ADDRESSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 56, at 11.
85. See id.
86. See id. In January 2007, the OIC convened an eight-person work group to
develop its recommendations. Id. at 1. The OIC stated that it could not adopt this
proposal because it believed that the Washington State Constitution's prohibition
against impairment of the obligations of the contract prohibits eliminating the guaran-
teed renewability of WSHIP policies for current enrollees. Id. at 12.
87. See id. at 11.
88. Washington is the only state to use standardized underwriting to refer appli-
cants to the high-risk pool. The state uses a Standard Health Questionnaire to stand-
ardize underwriting for individual health plans. When an applicant scores over 324
points on the questionnaire, the applicant is referred to WSHIP. Id. at 14.
89. See id. at 15.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 16. An insurer's loss ratio consists of incurred losses (the amount it has
paid out as claims) plus any loss adjustment expenses, divided by its earned premi-
ums. See Rupp's Insurance and Risk Management Glossary. Loss Ratio, http://insur-
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Adjusting this figure has the potential to lower premiums in the
individual market, which would theoretically produce lower premi-
ums for WSHIP enrollees.92 Because of the quick timeframe the
Commission gave the OIC to complete its work, the 0IC was una-
ble to evaluate the impact on premiums of adjusting the eight per-
cent WSHIP eligibility threshold and the seventy-two percent
individual-plan loss ratio. The OIC recommended that the legisla-
ture provide funding for the 0IC to perform this evaluation by
September 1, 2008.93
The 0IC did not confine its exploration of methods to make
health insurance coverage more affordable to the existing WSHIP.
The OIC commissioned a report ("Chollet Report") exploring al-
ternative options for making coverage for high-cost individuals
more affordable. 94 The Chollet Report specifically examined the
possible uses of reinsurance, high-risk pools, expanding the pri-
mary insurance market to cover more high-risk individuals, and
risk-adjustment strategies." The majority of the report explains
the concept of reinsurance, and analyzes its possible use as a state-
sponsored market-support strategy to make individual insurance
more available and affordable.96 Because reinsurance limits the
ance.cch.com/rupps/loss-ratio.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). Under Washington law,
there is little incentive for a health insurance carrier to pay out insufficient amounts in
claims payments, and/or maintain extremely high premiums, because either or both of
these circumstances will result in a loss ratio higher than seventy-two percent, which
will trigger the payment of the excess to WSHIP. A reasonable insurer would spend
those funds to lower premiums and/or pay additional claims to engender customer
goodwill, rather than pay it to the state with no reciprocal benefit. See, e.g., Retail
Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing
that a reasonable employer would put money into enhancing employee benefits to
attract and retain quality employees, rather than pay the same amount of money to
the state, where its payment will buy no such ancillary benefit).
92. ADDRESSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 56, at 16.
93. See id. at 15.
94. CHOLLET, supra note 60. The Chollet Report states that a high-risk pool, such
as WSHIP, is "potentially the least effective means in helping individuals find and
retain adequate coverage." Id. at 13.
95. See id. "Reinsurance" is best described as insurance for insurers. Insurers
purchase reinsurance to protect themselves from the risk of large losses. The princi-
pal goal of reinsurance is to spread risk incurred by insurers from a small proportion
of high-cost individuals who account for a significant percentage of the total medical
cost of the pool. Id. at 2-3 (noting that the highest-cost one percent of the population
accounts for at least twenty-five percent of total health-care expenditures). "Risk
adjustment" is a process of measuring the health expenditures of groups or individu-
als enrolled in competing insurance plans and adjusting payment to the plans to ac-
count for the differences in their risks of health-care expenditures. Id. at 11. Risk
adjustment acts as a equalizer of insurers, so that insurers have less incentive to en-
gage in "cherry-picking"-insuring only the populations with the lowest risks.
96. See id. at 2.
HEALTHY WASHINGTON INITIATIVE
downside exposure of enrolling new individuals, conventional, un-
subsidized reinsurance generally either reduces the primary in-
surer's need for very high reserves, thereby (theoretically) reducing
premiums, or removes the incentive for primary insurers to rate
and design their benefits to avoid risk, thereby (theoretically) im-
proving access to adequate coverage for small groups and individu-
als with health problems.97
State-subsidized reinsurance is intended to directly reduce pri-
mary-insurance premiums, and to support insurers that are obli-
gated by law to offer insurance to high-risk groups and
individuals. 98 States that operate reinsurance plans generally fol-
low one of two models: (1) those that permit primary insurers to
obtain reinsurance when the policyholder renews coverage, even if
the primary insurer did not purchase reinsurance when the appli-
cant first enrolled; and (2) those that permit primary insurers to
reinsure only when an applicant first enrolls.99 In addition, states
that operate reinsurance plans follow several different benefit de-
sign models. 100 States must decide the appropriate attachment
point for reinsurance, the covered services and cost-sharing obliga-
tions that are counted towards the attachment point and are sub-
ject to reinsurance after the attachment point is reached, and
whether the program will be limited to primary insurance products
that are considered "standard" with regard to the benefits of-
fered. 101 The plan's benefit design has implications for the admin-
istrative cost of the reinsurance program and the amount of
reserves the program must maintain to properly anticipate risk.
102
States must also decide how they will finance their subsidized
reinsurance plan. All states require primary insurers to pay a pre-
mium for the subsidized reinsurance.103 Some states cap their pre-
miums, thereby ensuring that the state will levy assessments against
all insurers, even those who do not use the reinsurance pool in ad-
dition to the premiums to fund the reinsurance pool.104 Other
states do not cap their premiums, or have a very high cap, thereby
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. Studies suggest that removing the medical costs of the highest-cost three
percent of insured lives via public financing could reduce average premiums by one-
third. Id.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id. at 6.
101. Id. at 6-7 (citing the examples of reinsurance programs maintained by Arizona,
Connecticut, Idaho, New Mexico, and New York).
102. See id. at 7.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id.
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making assessments against primary insurers less likely. 115 Gener-
ally, programs with capped premiums encourage broader participa-
tion in the reinsurance pool by primary insurers. In contrast,
programs with uncapped premiums encourage fewer insurers to
use the pool, and therefore limit the program's effect on the access
costs in the primary market.1 6 Currently, no state has financed a
reinsurance program in whole or in part by using general tax
revenues. 107
The Chollet Report compares the advantages and disadvantages
of reinsurance, risk adjustment, and high-risk pools such as WSHIP
on making small group and individual insurance more affordable,
accessible, and effective." 8 The Chollet Report concludes that ei-
ther a properly structured reinsurance or risk-adjustment program
performs better than the WSHIP high-risk pool.109 The report rec-
ommends that Washington undertake further study and gather
quantitative data to explore the options of reinsurance or risk ad-
justment as alternatives to WSHIP.110
B. Legislation Directed Towards Reforming the Small Group
& Individual Insurance Markets
The Blue Ribbon Commission's short time frame for input from
the Insurance Commissioner on ways to make insurance products
more affordable and accessible to small businesses, individuals, and
young adults and/or children inhibited the Commissioner's ability
to gather complete and meaningful data from the private insurance
market to aid it in making recommendations in this regard. Never-
theless, the legislature and governor have continued this project.
They created a Health Insurance Partnership Board (the "Board")
and charged it with developing policies to connect employees of
small businesses with health plans that qualify for premium-subsidy
payments."1 Subsidies will be based on gross family income, fam-
ily size, and the ages of eligible family members." 2 The entire sub-
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 10.
108. See id. at 21-24.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Id. at 25.
111. See Engrossed Second Substitute, H.B. 1569, 60th Leg., 2007 Sess. §§ 4-5
(Wash. 2007) [hereinafter H.B. 1569]. The Board must include at least four health-
benefit plans, with multiple deductible and point-of-service cost-sharing options. Id.
§ 5(b). The plans must offer coverage ranging from catastrophic to comprehensive,
and must include one high-deductible health plan. Id.
112. S.B. 5930 § 58(2)(g).
616 [Vol. XXXV
HEALTHY WASHINGTON INITIATIVE
sidy will be applied to the employee's premium obligation;
therefore, the small business employer would not get any subsidy
for his or her contribution.1 3 Enrollment in the partnership is not
an entitlement; if the funding appropriated for the partnership fails
to cover expenditures, the Health Care Authority Administrator
may freeze new enrollment in the program and establish a waiting
list. 1 4 Administrative expenses will be paid for through a
surcharge on all health-benefit plans offered through the partner-
ship." 5 The surcharge, however, must be included in the premium
for each health-benefit plan, thereby passing this cost on to the em-
ployer and employee." 6
The employer remains free to determine the criteria for eligibil-
ity and enrollment in its benefit plan, and the terms and amounts of
the employer's contributions to that plan, subject to a minimum
employer premium contribution level the Board established." 17
Nevertheless, in order to participate, a small employer must estab-
lish a cafeteria plan under section 125 of the Federal Internal Reve-
nue Code that will enable employees to use pre-tax dollars to pay
their share of the premiums. 1 8 Small employers must also comply
with the open-enrollment requirements of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") and must act as a
plan sponsor or administrator in accordance with federal law. 119
The Board is charged with developing appropriate rating method-
ologies, but they must be based on the already-existing adjusted
community rating criteria for small groups. 2 0' The legislation did
not authorize the rate-band change from 375% to 425% that had
been suggested by the private insurers who participated in the In-
surance Commissioner's data-gathering exercise to prepare the re-
port requested by the Blue Ribbon Commission.12 ' Nor did it
change the age brackets an insurer is permitted to use for adjusted
community rating, as the private insurers suggested. 1
22
H.B. 1569 requires the partnership to begin accepting applica-
tions from participants eligible to receive premiums by September
113. Id.
114. H.B. 1569 § 12.
115. S.B. 5930 § 58(2)(f).
116. Id.
117. H.B. 1569 § 5(a).
118. S.B. 5930 § 58(2)(a).
119. Id. § 58(2)(b).
120. S.B. 1569 § 5(e).
121. See id. § 7(3)(d).
122. See id. § 7(3)(b).
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1, 2008.123 The Board must submit a preliminary report to the gov-
ernor and the legislature that includes an implementation plan to
incorporate the individual and small-group markets into the part-
nership on or before December 1, 2008.124 The Board must submit
a report and recommendations to the governor and legislature by
September 1, 2009, regarding the possibility of having additional
markets participate in the partnership, including public employees,
public school employees, and persons enrolled in Washington's Ba-
sic Health Plan.125
C. Legislation Directed Towards Reforming the
High-risk Insurance Market
Following the recommendations of the Chollet Report, the legis-
lature and the governor statutorily authorized the Insurance Com-
missioner to evaluate options and design a state-supported
reinsurance program.1 26 An interim report from the Commission
on this process was due to the governor and legislature by Decem-
ber 1, 2007, and a final report, including implementing legislation
and financing options, is due by September 1, 2008. The legislation
directs the Commissioner to prepare a very detailed report, includ-
ing an analysis of the costs and benefits of state-sponsored reinsur-
ance, and more importantly, directs the Commissioner to evaluate
and quantify, where possible, the behavioral responses of insurers
to the program (i.e., whether insurers will actually reduce premi-
ums in response to the availability of subsidized reinsurance, and
make coverage for high-cost individuals more affordable and avail-
able). 27 It also directs the Commissioner to use a specified rein-
surance corridor in designing the plan.128
Although the legislation contemplates transitioning from the
WSHIP to a new subsidized reinsurance plan, it also implements
the Insurance Commissioner's major recommendations to reform
the WSHIP in the near-term.129 It allows the WSHIP to offer ben-
123. Id. § 6.
124. Id. § 10.
125. Id. § 11. The Basic Health Plan is a subsidized health plan sponsored by the
state, available to individuals that fall below a certain level of income but are not
eligible for Medicaid.
126. See S.B. 5930 § 25.
127. Id. § 25(1).
128. The reinsurance corridor (the amount of loss at which the reinsurance pay-
ment is triggered) specified by the legislature is $10,000 to $90,000. Id. § 25(1)(b).
129. See id. § 25(1)(e)(g) (contemplating that there will be a transition from the
"status quo" to reinsurance).
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efit plans that are not comprehensive, although it requires WSHIP
to include at least one comprehensive plan.1 30 For the comprehen-
sive plan, S.B. 5930 changes certain benefit maximums to benefit
minimums.3 It also mandates that WSHIP contract with proven
disease-management providers and requires WSHIP to "en-
courage" enrollees who are eligible for care-management services
to participate. 32
The legislature and the governor also appear to have rejected the
Commissioner's understanding of the Washington State Constitu-
tion's "impairment of contracts" clause. 133 The new legislation re-
places WSHIP's "guaranteed renewability" language with a more
flexible "continued coverage" guarantee.134 Rather than requiring
WSHIP to continue offering the same plan to enrollees from year-
to-year, as did the prior WSHIP legislation, the new legislation re-
quires only that WSHIP make a replacement plan, which includes
all of the services covered under the enrollees' current plan, and is
available to all individuals in the plan being replaced.1 35 The new
plan must not "significantly" limit access to the kind of services
covered under the replacement plan through "unreasonable" cost-
sharing requirements or otherwise. 36 Individuals enrolled in
WSHIP must be permitted to transfer to a plan that is fully compa-
rable to the plan it replaces. 37 The legislation, however, does not
define what constitutes a "significant" limit on access or an "unrea-
sonable" cost-sharing requirement. Additionally, it has specific no-
tice requirements for enrollees whose WSHIP plans are
discontinued, and requires WSHIP to evaluate the impact on
WSHIP enrollees prior to discontinuing a plan.1
38
130. See id. § 26(4).
131. See id. § 26(4)(a) (inpatient hospital days and inpatient mental and chemical
dependency treatment); id. § 26(4)(e) (skilled nursing facilities).
132. See id. § 26(10).
133. In order for Washington to violate the State Constitution's "impairment of
contracts" clause, a court would have to find that the impairment was substantial and
did not serve a legitimate public purpose. See Tyrpak v. Daniels, 874 P.2d 1374
(Wash. 1994). Alternatively, if the impairment was minimal, it could violate the im-
pairment of contracts clause if it was not a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power. Id. Given the current problems with WSHIP, it seems likely that if the
change from "guaranteed renewability" to a guarantee of "continued coverage" was
challenged under this clause, the change would be found both to serve a legitimate
public purpose and to be a proper exercise of the state's police power. See id.
134. See S.B. 5930 § 27(1).
135. See id. § 27(4)(a).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. § 27(4)(b).
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II. WHAT AN EFFECTIVE HEALTHY WASHINGTON
INITIATIVE SHOULD LOOK LIKE
The Blue Ribbon Commission performed a thorough study, and
its efforts to explore the possibilities for meaningful health care
reform in Washington are laudable. Nevertheless, the Commis-
sion's and the legislature's efforts will be unsuccessful if the state
fails to consider not only who is uninsured, but why they are unin-
sured. Both nationally and in Washington, recent efforts to extend
health insurance coverage to uninsured populations have focused
on children and young adolescents under age twenty-one. Never-
theless, recent statistics show that this is not the population at the
greatest risk of being uninsured. 139 Federal statistics show that
more than ten million young adults are uninsured-a 33.2% unin-
surance rate. 140 Washington is no exception to this national trend.
The percentage of adults ages 19-25 covered by employer-spon-
sored health insurance dropped from 63.4% in 2000 to 53.1% in
2006.141 During the same time period, the percentage of young
adults covered by public programs and individual insurance has re-
mained virtually flat, while the percentage of young adults without
any health insurance rose from 18.4% in 2000 to 29% in 2006.142
Of the total uninsured population in Washington, 50.7% are adults
ages 19-34, and 29.8% are adults ages 19-25.143 In addition, the risk
of being uninsured is growing far faster for this age group than for
any other age group in the population. 4 4
Financially, most of Washington's uninsured are near or below
the poverty line. 145 They also have the fastest growing risk of being
uninsured of any income level group. 46 Despite the fact that most
of the uninsured have incomes under 200% of the poverty level,
the overwhelming majority of them are in families where there is at
139. See Rosenbaum, supra note 35.
140. Id.
141. See WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., HEALTH INSURANCE PARTNERSHIP
BOARD ORIENTATION § 3, http://www.hip.hca.wa.gov/doc/pre-meeting-materials-092
407.pdf [hereinafter HIP BOARD ORIENTATION] (discussing HIP Board Overview on
Washington State Insurance Trends).
142. See id.
143. See id. § 2, at 7.
144. See id. The reason for this may be that this demographic includes many ado-
lescents who age out of the state safety-net systems that have provided them with
health insurance throughout their childhood, such as child welfare programs, foster-
care placements, and special education programs. See Rosenbaum, supra note 35, at
w614.
145. See id. § 2, at 8.
146. See id.
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least one worker.'47 Slightly over half of the uninsured are adults
without children, and again, in Washington, this is the group with
the fastest growing risk of being uninsured out of all demographic
groups. 148 In Washington, of the uninsured who are themselves
working, 32.9% are self-employed.' 4 9 This is more than the per-
centages of uninsured that small and very small employers em-
ploy. 5 ° Of those who are uninsured, 28.6% are not in the work
force, either voluntarily or through involuntary unemployment. 151
The assumptions that most of the uninsured young adults are
employed by small businesses, and that access to health insurance
for all but the elderly and the "deserving" poor should be tied to
employment, have spurred states to take more aggressive action to
reform their health insurance markets to make coverage for those
employed by small businesses more affordable. 5 2 Numerous state
reforms are centered on small businesses and their employees, and
they range from programs very similar to the Healthy Washington
Initiative's Health Insurance Partnership, designed to make it eas-
ier and more affordable for small businesses to offer health insur-
ance to employees, to mandates requiring individuals, employers,
and/or insurers to participate in the health insurance market.153
Health care reform policies that focus on increasing accessibility of
insurance through the workplace have been shown to encourage
the development of new health insurance markets, but do not in-
crease the overall levels of insurance coverage. 54 Nevertheless,
the Washington statistics show that the majority of uninsured
young adults in the state are self-employed or not employed at all.
Therefore, "solutions" to the problem of the uninsured that con-
tinue to link accessibility of health insurance to traditional employ-
ment, or focus on only the "deserving" poor and the relatively
small percentage of people who fall into the high-risk category,
may increase the number and accessibility of such products in
147. See id. § 2, at 9; see also Barrilleaux & Brace, supra note 2, at 658 (stating that
the working poor make up a large part of the uninsured population).
148. See HIP BOARD ORIENTATION, supra note 141, § 2, at 10.
149. See id. § 2, at 12.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Rosenbaum, supra note 35, at w614.
153. See Washington State Blue Ribbon Commission on Health Care Costs and
Access, supra note 19.
154. See Mark A. Hall, The Impact of Health Insurance Market Reforms on Market
Competition, 6 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 57 (2000), available at http://www.ajmc.com/
files/articlefiles/AJMC2000JanHalp57_67.pdf.
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Washington, but they are not comprehensive solutions to the prob-
lem of the uninsured in the state.
Malcolm Gladwell, in his best-selling book The Tipping Point:
How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, describes the "tip-
ping point" as the point at which something that was once consid-
ered outside of the norm becomes the norm, and therefore,
fundamental change occurs. 155 There is currently a vigorous de-
bate amongst researchers as to whether we have reached the tip-
ping point where employers will stop offering health insurance
benefits as part of their employment packages. 156 Even if we have
not yet reached the "tipping point" that will spur fundamental
change in the employment-based health insurance system from the
employers' point of view, there is evidence that from the perspec-
tive of health care consumers, we are at or very close to a tipping
point. The model of work for those under age thirty-five continues
to evolve from full-time, permanent employment to longer periods
of schooling continuing into adulthood, and more self, temporary,
and part-time employment. 157 As this trend continues, and per-
haps accelerates, it is likely that an increasing number of people
will no longer be in a position to benefit from traditional employ-
ment-based health insurance. Therefore, any reform that continues
to link availability of health insurance to employment will merely
nibble away at increasingly smaller pieces of the problem.
Furthermore, as it covers declining segments of the population,
employment-based health insurance will become increasingly inef-
ficient and expensive to maintain. In Washington, the OIC con-
servatively estimates that thirty cents of every health care dollar
received by health care providers is spent on administrative ex-
155. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE
A BIG DIFFERENCE (2003).
156. Compare Paul Fronstin, The Future of Employment-Based Health Benefits:
Have Employers Reached a Tipping Point?, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (EBRI), (Issue
Brief No. 312 Dec. 2007) (arguing that employers have not yet reached the tipping
point) with COMM. FOR ECON. DEV. (CED), QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE
FOR ALL: MOVING BEYOND THE EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH-INSURANCE SYSTEM
REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report-healthcare200710.
pdf (urging replacement of the employment-based health benefits system).
157. See, e.g., Ashley Smith, What Generation Y Wants in a Job, TELEGRAPH
(Nashua, N.H.), Nov. 26, 2007 (reporting that Generation Y (those born between
1979 and 1999) wants to spend less time "paying their dues" in entry-level positions,
values flex-time, plans to switch careers more often and expect to spend more time in
school than previous generations. This indicates that they are more likely to be em-
ployed part-time, be periodically unemployed, or be full-time students than prior gen-
erations, and therefore more likely to be ineligible for health insurance offered
through an employer).
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penses for health plans and providers. Before a health-care dollar
even gets to a provider, approximately fourteen cents of the insur-
ance premium has been consumed by health plan administration. 158
The inefficiencies of this system, although noticeable in the aggre-
gate, will become even more noticeable to those who bear them
when they are spread amongst a decreasing percentage of the adult
population, specifically those with traditional full-time employ-
ment. When enough people with political (i.e., voting) power are
not served by an increasingly expensive and inefficient system, and
the shrinking pool of workers who are served by the system (albeit
badly) notice that they are shouldering an increasingly greater indi-
vidual share of the financial burden of maintaining an inefficient
system, the system will be forced to change.
The employment-based health insurance system is merely a ves-
tige of sixty-five-year-old World War II-era wage controls and high
corporate taxes during the war period, and not the "sacred cow"
that most American politicians view it as. 159 Given the current
trends in employment (or unemployment) for those under age
thirty-five, only reforms that de-link health insurance from employ-
ment will reach young adults, the fastest-growing segment of the
uninsured population.
Maintaining an individual, virtually unregulated health insurance
market that operates in parallel with an employment-based market
that serves an increasingly older and sicker population results in
untenable individual and employment-based insurance rates.
Eight years ago, Washington passed legislation designed to stimu-
late the individual health insurance market by removing persons
likely to be the most costly individuals to insure from the market,
and stripping the 0IC of its authority to regulate individual health
158. OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM'R, WASH. STATE, HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATIVE
EXPENSE ANALYSIS, BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION #6, FINAL RE-
PORT 3 (2007), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/consumers/documents/BRCEfficiencies
_Report.pdf.
159. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
333-34 (1982); Randall K. Abbott, Will Employer-provided Health Benefits Disappear
by 2010?, 21 J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS 8, (May/June 2005); Leon Applebaum,
The Development of Voluntary Health Insurance in the United States, 28 J. INSURANCE
28-33 (Sept. 1961); Carolyn V. Juarez, Liberty, Justice, and Insurance for All: Re-
Imagining the Employment-Based Health Insurance System, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
881, 885 (Spring 2004). But see Frank R. Dobbin, The Origins of Private Social Insur-
ance: Public Policy and Fringe Benefits in America, 1920-1950, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1416,
1437-38 (stating that war-time price and wage controls took effect after employers had
already started offering fringe benefits such as health insurance to retain workers).
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insurance rates. 160 Despite these efforts to maintain an affordable
individual health-insurance market, which could cover those who
are not eligible for employment-based insurance, rates for individ-
ual health-care coverage have increased an average of sixteen per-
cent since the legislation was enacted.1 61 Recently, the second-
largest individual health insurance plan in the state has filed a rate
increase of 22.5% for 2008.162 Clearly, this growth rate is untena-
ble and only further increases the number of uninsured in the state
by placing individual insurance coverage out of reach for a greater
number of young adults.
In order to efficiently integrate these two markets, without insti-
tuting a politically unpalatable and possibly equally inefficient sin-
gle-payor government-run system, the state should start by giving
the tax benefits currently given to employers who pay all or part of
their employees' health insurance premiums directly to those who
purchase health insurance.1 63 The state should require insurance
companies to community-rate their products for an entire geo-
graphic area, and to insure everybody who applies for their insur-
ance product within that area. To guarantee that insurers fairly
share the risk of high-cost claims, the state should establish fund
pools that compare the risks of insurers in various parts of the
state. Insurers with below-average demographic factors would
draw money from the pools to compensate for taking on these in-
creased risks that are unavoidable in a community-rating system.
Insurers with above-average demographic factors would pay
money into the pools, to ensure that there are not innumerable
choices of insurance for citizens living in areas with favorable
demographics and virtually no choices of insurance for those living
in areas with unfavorable demographics. 164 This would also dis-
courage insurers from selling their products only in markets with
the healthiest populations.
In order to encourage private-insurer participation in this re-
formed health insurance market, the state should institute a "risk-
160. See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM'R, FACT SHEET: RESTORING
AUTHORITY IN THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH MARKET, http://www.insurance.wa.gov/oic
files/rules/proposed/ESB526lFactSheet.pdf.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that eliminating the employer tax deduc-
tion for health benefits would bring about the "tipping point" for employers to stop
offering health-insurance benefits to employees. See Fronstin, supra note 155, at 14.
164. See Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Curiale, 617 N.Y.S.2d 377 (App. Div.
1994) (describing a similar system).
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corridor" strategy, similar to the strategy employed by the federal
government to encourage private-plan participation in Medicare
Part D, the prescription drug benefit for senior citizens. 165 Under
this strategy, private plans would set their premiums for a geo-
graphic area based on a target cost figure the state calculates. The
target cost figure would be the anticipated average yearly cost of
care for an enrollee in the plan. If the plan spent less than the
targeted cost per enrollee, the insurer would keep a small percent-
age of the savings, and be required to reinvest the remainder of the
savings in the plan by enriching the benefit package or lowering
plan premiums. If the plan exceeds the targeted cost per enrollee,
the state will pay a percentage of the excess costs to the plan as
reinsurance. This will remove some of the uncertainty and the risk
of large losses, provide an incentive for the insurer to deliver cost-
effective, quality care and to encourage healthy lifestyles for en-
rollees, and encourage insurer participation in the market.
The legislature and the governor should also rethink their deci-
sion not to allow insurers to provide benefit packages to specific
groups that do not contain all of the benefits that are currently
mandated by Washington law. Because uninsured young adults are
typically willing to accept a certain amount of risk, are not in their
years of peak earning potential, and are generally healthy, they are
a particularly attractive market for pared-down benefits packages
tailored to their most likely health-care needs. It would be worth-
while to explore whether pared-down benefits packages are neces-
sary to lower premiums to levels where young adults could afford
coverage for their basic, catastrophic, and preventative medical
needs, thus allowing them to save for any possible future medical
needs that the pared-down plans do not cover.
Even a health insurance system that is completely independent
from employment will be useless if people do not access it. Young
adults without children or other dependents tend to consider them-
selves "invincible," and are far less likely to purchase health insur-
ance for themselves than older adults or adults with children. 166
Any effective effort to reform the private insurance market to
165. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
166. See Gene Meyer, 'Boomerang' Generation Comes Back to Empty Nest, KAN.
CITY STAR, Aug. 6, 2007 (quoting an insurance provider who recognizes that young
adults who are recently out of college and return home to live are likely to age out of
their parents health care insurance, and that young adults "don't think about being
uninsured, and most don't know how much health care can cost you if you go
uninsured.")
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reach the uninsured in Washington must mandate that all who can
afford it must purchase health insurance. 167 Nevertheless, experi-
ence reveals that compliance with government mandates is highest
when the mandated action is affordable; therefore, there must be
an affordable private health insurance market for an individual
coverage mandate to be effective. 68 The requirements of geo-
graphic community-rating, risk-pool adjustments, and limited gov-
ernment reinsurance through "risk corridors" should result in the
emergence of an affordable private insurance market.
If the penalty for noncompliance with an individual health insur-
ance mandate is insignificant, then noncompliance likely becomes
financially attractive.1 69 Furthermore, individuals subject to the
mandate must believe that penalties for noncompliance are likely
to be enforced against them for the mandate to be effective. 7 ° In
order to enforce an individual health insurance mandate, those
who choose not to purchase insurance could be tracked through
multiple data sources, such as comparing voter registration and
driver's license records, with the records of insurers who cover the
geographic area under review. 17' Financial penalties for noncom-
pliance, however, have proven to be of limited utility in other con-
texts, such as mandated automobile liability insurance and
minimum-wage laws.1 72 More effective are penalties for non-com-
pliance that prevent the individual from participating in important
aspects of life, such as exclusion from school or day care for failure
to comply with required childhood immunizations. 73 Possible ex-
clusions that might be effective with a majority of the young adult
population are the inability to obtain a driver's license, enroll in an
institute of higher education or vocational school, or be employed
without showing the employer proof of health insurance. Financial
penalties for failure to purchase health insurance are likely to be
ineffective among a large number of the uninsured, particularly
young, relatively healthy adults, who are willing to take their
167. See Barilleaux & Brace, supra note 2, at 675.
168. See Sherry A. Glied, Jacob Hartz, & Genessa Giorgi, Consider it Done? The
Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1612, 1618
(2007).
169. See id. If the penalty is too high, however, people simply will not pay it. Id.
170. See id. at 1618-19.
171. See id. at 1619.
172. See id. at 1616-17.
173. See id. at 1616.
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chances and deal with the costs of receiving care when they need
it. 174
Finally, for those who truly cannot afford the cost of private
health insurance, we should lay to rest the notion of the "deserv-
ing" poor, and provide government-subsidized insurance to all who
meet income and resource eligibility guidelines, regardless of why
they meet those guidelines. 175 The lives and health of young adults
without children are just as worth preserving as the lives of young
adults with children.176 Today's "slackers" may be tomorrow's en-
gines of innovation, but if they are derailed by bad health and the
inability to access quality health care, their contributions will be
lost to society. 77
CONCLUSION
Washingtonians have demonstrated their desire and willingness
to try both state-based and market-based health-care reform poli-
cies to address the problem of the uninsured. 178 Governor Gre-
goire's statement that health care is a right, and the creation of,
and the extensive work done by, the Blue Ribbon Commission and
174. See, e.g., Hanns Kuttner & Matthew S. Rutledge, Higher Income and Unin-
sured: Common or Rare?, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1745, 1752 (2007).
175. See Sandra Tanenbaum, Medicaid Eligibility Policy in the 1980s: Medical Utili-
tarianism and the "Deserving" Poor, 20 J. HEALTH POL. PoLY & L. 933 (1995).
176. Indeed, this category includes many of our college and graduate students,
many of whom will make extensive contributions to our economy in the coming years.
Because so many of them are unemployed or are employed in part-time jobs that are
low-paying and do not offer insurance, they remain ineligible for Medicaid and unable
to afford private insurance.
177. As of this Article, two bills have been introduced into the Washington Legisla-
ture to establish a state-wide catastrophic and preventative health insurance program
that would be available to virtually all residents of Washington. The program would
be funded by a payroll tax levied on employers and employees, and would be adminis-
tered by private health insurers who competitively bid for the contracts. All benefits
mandated by state law must be included in the program's coverage, and persons who
are eligible for coverage under the program but who do not register with an insurance
carrier participating in the program will be assigned to a carrier. Premium rates will
be based on a single community-rated risk pool. See H.B. 2640, 60th Leg., 2008 Sess.
(Wash. 2008); S.B. 6603, 60th Leg., 2008 Sess. (Wash. 2008). Although these bills have
some promising elements, their continued reliance on an employer- and employee-
financed system to cover all Washingtonians, including those who do not work, makes
them financially vulnerable and somewhat inequitable. In addition, they do not man-
date any penalties or disincentives for failure to enroll, and it is unclear how persons
who fail to enroll will be identified and assigned to a carrier. Both bills have been
referred to the respective chambers' Committees on Health.
178. See Barilleaux & Brace, supra note 2, at 666 (listing Washington as a state that
has embraced a high number of state-based health insurance reform policies and a
high number of market-based health insurance reform policies to address the problem
of the uninsured).
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the administrative and executive agencies working to carry out its
mandates, also demonstrate that Washington has the political will
to make major changes to its health insurance system that would
have a real impact on those who are currently uninsured and those
who are most likely to constitute the uninsured in the future.
Many of these people are young, childless adults. Washington is
moving in the right direction by considering a mixture of market-
based and state-based policies, and by introducing legislation that
would make catastrophic and primary care available for all. But
without the political will to institute and enforce a properly tai-
lored individual mandate, and to divorce health insurance from the
employment system, these efforts will not have the desired effect of
making Washington one of the healthiest states in the nation. If
health care is truly a right, then it should not disappear when one is
unemployed, self-employed, or in school. We need to match our
legislation to our vision, if we are truly to become a Healthy
Washington.
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